Newsroom live
Cases7 min read

Fixing an offer before scaling: Reg2Dep from 30% to 70%

An affiliate network's in-house team spent $686K on influencer traffic for a new offer in Australia. Reg2Dep rose from 29.75% to a reported 69.52%. What the numbers show and what they do not.

Australian flag draped over a ledge with a short and a tall stack of gold coins, Sydney Opera House behind

An affiliate network's in-house buyers spent $686K in six months on influencer traffic for a new Australian offer. Reg2Dep rose from 29.75% in January to 44.85% in March, later peaking at 69.52%, with 4,111 first deposits at about $167 each. It says the aim was to improve the product and prepare it for partners. Every figure is its own.

Results at a glance

MetricValueNote
Spend$686,000Reported by Riddick's Partners, not independently verified
Period1 January to 30 JuneReported by the network; year not stated in its write-up
Reg2Dep29.75% (Jan) → 44.85% (Mar) → 69.52% peakReported by the network; month of the peak not given
First deposits4,111Reported by the network; direct attribution only, brand search users excluded
Cost per first depositabout $167Reported by the network; $686,000 / 4,111 = $166.87 (our arithmetic)
Total player depositsabout $1.5MReported by the network; gross deposits, not revenue or profit

What Reg2Dep means and how it moved

Reg2Dep, short for registration-to-deposit rate, is the percentage of new sign-ups who go on to fund an account. Click-to-registration (c2r) shows whether traffic turns into sign-ups; Reg2Dep shows whether the product turns those sign-ups into paying players. Our guide to affiliate metrics covers how it sits next to CR and cost per FTD.

In this test the rate more than doubled, and the timing is the useful part. Volume was ramped up over the first two months, and from month three each registration cost more. Over the same stretch, the share of registrants who deposited was higher in March than in January and later reached 69.52%. That is why cost per registration alone can mislead on a test like this; the network's own explanation is in Results.

Context

The case comes from Riddick's Partners, an affiliate network launched in 2024, and covers work by its in-house media buying team. It doubles as a pitch: the post ends by promoting the network's exclusive offers to affiliates. Treat it as a vendor's account with useful detail, not an audited result. For how a network buying traffic itself differs from its affiliates' work, see CPA network vs ad network vs direct advertiser.

The starting point was thin. An advertiser brought the network an exclusive offer built for Australia that had never seen real traffic: close to zero users and no stats to go on. Australia is a Tier 1 GEO, so a weak product burns an expensive budget quickly.

The groundwork was meant to keep the first serious money for testing the offer itself, not for hunting for an approach that works. The team prepared its search presence so users who searched the brand after seeing an ad would not land on an empty results page. It also planned which creators, formats and sources to buy first, and made an early call on how well the product suited Australian players.

The write-up never names the product or its vertical, and we do not guess, which matters for the law. Under Australia's Interactive Gambling Act 2001, providing a prohibited interactive gambling service to customers in Australia is an offence (s 15), and publishing an advertisement for a designated interactive gambling service in Australia is prohibited (s 61EA). Betting on sporting events, other than in-play betting, is an excluded wagering service (s 8A), but providers of such regulated services must hold a state or territory licence (s 15AA). Online casino-style games are not excluded. This is a summary of public law, not legal advice.

What they did

More than 90% of the budget went to influencer marketing, and creators were used for three jobs: reach, brand building and product feedback.

Picking creators. On paper the filters were reach, engagement rate and audience trust. The network says the deciding factor was local judgement, because a creator's stats do not show whether that person can get Australians to sign up and deposit.

Buying placements. Instagram, YouTube and Snapchat were the main platforms. A creator's strongest platform set the starting point, though deals often bundled every channel that creator ran. New videos went out in a steady stream to keep the brand in front of viewers.

Three choices shaped the funnel:

  • Straight to the product. There was no pre-lander or warm-up step. Viewers clicked through to the product itself, and onboarding and in-product retention did the converting.

  • Brand over the single video. Integrations were native, with no hard sell, and each one was branded. The network concedes branding can cost an individual video some conversions, and says the trade paid off in recognition that lifted its other sources. That causal claim is the network's own.

  • Comments as product research. Viewers with a question or doubt about the product tended to ask the creator, in comments or chat, rather than contact support. The buying team collected these questions and objections and passed them to the advertiser's team, so it could fix problem flows and tune onboarding and retention before partners got the offer. The write-up does not say what was changed.

Influencer spend was tapered near the end rather than switched off. The network says the posts still running kept adding new users and pulled back earlier registrants who had not deposited yet.

Results

On direct attribution, the network reports 4,111 first deposits (FTDs) for its $686,000, an average cost per first deposit of about $167. Players deposited roughly $1.5M in total. That is gross player money, not operator revenue and not the network's earnings, so no ROI or profit can be worked out from it.

Why did dearer registrations not push the cost per deposit up? The network's answer is delayed conversion: some users reached a deposit only after repeat contact with the campaign, so later sign-ups kept converting.

The 4,111 count also leaves out a second stream the network reports: people who came in by searching the brand name. Their volume was 30-38% of the influencer-attributed user count.

From June to August, a window that runs past the stated 30 June end of the spend period, the team tested other sources. The write-up does not say whether this spend is inside the $686,000. The network's own funnel numbers:

  • Facebook PWA: c2r 25-40%, r2d 20-25%

  • In-app: c2r 37-43%, r2d 15%

  • PPC: c2r 37-42%, r2d 30%

  • ASO: c2r 35%, r2d 20%

  • UAC: c2r up to 50%, r2d 15-20%

These describe one product, one GEO and one team over a few months. They are not benchmarks.

What did not work

  • Registration got dearer. From month three each sign-up cost more. The team kept going because deposit rates were improving, according to the network; that logic suits a learning budget more than a profit target.

  • Branding versus conversion. Branded integrations built awareness but sometimes cut the conversion of individual videos.

  • No pre-lander. Sending cold influencer traffic straight to a brand-new product left all the persuasion to an onboarding flow that the audience feedback was still flagging problems in.

The evidence has gaps too: one source, no operator-side confirmation, no year, no monthly spend split, no detail on what the advertiser changed and no profit figure for anyone. The network says the advertiser and its partners took the main benefit, but publishes nothing to show it.

Takeaways for affiliates

  • Judge a new offer on how far users go down the funnel, from registration to deposit, not only on what a registration costs.

  • Treat creators' comment sections as product research, and agree with the advertiser before scaling who will act on what you collect.

  • If the network's explanation holds, delayed depositors need time. Measure Reg2Dep by registration cohort, not by same-month ratios.

  • Agree with the advertiser up front whether a test is meant to fix the product or to make money, and budget for that.

  • The network reports that brand lift showed up in search. Plan for demand that direct attribution will not credit to your campaign.

  • For a different route to the same metric, compare how repacked creatives lifted Reg2Dep from 8% to 22%.

FAQ

What is Reg2Dep in iGaming affiliate marketing?

It is the percentage of registered users who make a deposit. Click-to-registration measures how well traffic turns into sign-ups; Reg2Dep measures how well the product turns sign-ups into paying players. FTD count is the absolute number behind it.

What is a good Reg2Dep rate?

There is no industry standard. It depends on the GEO, the source, the product and whether a team counts first deposits only. In this case it ran from about 30% to about 70%, and other channels in the same test showed 15-30%. Neither range is a benchmark.

Why can registrations get more expensive without raising cost per first deposit?

If a growing share of registrants go on to deposit, some only after repeat contact, the higher sign-up cost is spread across more deposits. That is the network's explanation here, and it rests on one period average rather than a monthly series. Check it against your own cohort data before relying on it.

How do you calculate Reg2Dep reliably?

As general practice, fix a registration cohort and a deposit window. Take everyone who registered in January and count how many deposited within 30 days of their own sign-up date: if 100 registered and 35 deposited in that window, January's Reg2Dep is 35%. Same-month tracker ratios mix cohorts and can understate a product with slow depositors.

Sources

Keep reading

All cases →